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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, corporate reorganizations under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code have broken records, both for the sheer
number of filings and in terms of their scale.1 Indeed, at the start of the
twenty-first century, we have witnessed five of the ten largest corporate
bankruptcy filings in U.S. history.2 News of the corporate filings of
WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, and Kmart dominate business
headlines. Once rather obscure events followed only by those with a
direct stake in the outcome, the largest corporate bankruptcies have now
become a routine part of public discourse.
Although the long-term consequences of this latest wave of massive
corporate bankruptcies are not clear, one point is indisputable. Corporate
bankruptcy cases have wide social, economic, and political reach.
Bankruptcy judges presiding over these immense and complicated
proceedings routinely issue rulings that have wide-ranging effects on
markets and individuals.3 By contrast, Chapter 11’s doctrinal framework is
often constricted, focusing as it does on the financial reorganization of
the business and on economic recovery for creditors. One of the
challenges facing bankruptcy scholars has been to explore and explain
the proper balance between the expansive reach of large corporate
bankruptcy cases and bankruptcy’s doctrinal constraints.4 This Article
follows in that tradition by examining the proper role of special interest
committees in large Chapter 11 cases.
Special interest committees have been appointed in some of the largest
1. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bankruptcy Doctors Are Most Definitely In, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2002, § 3, at 1 (describing how corporate restructuring is now a big
business).
2. Id.
3. See Jess Bravin, Judges’ Actions Have Wide Reach With Bankruptcy, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 24, 2001, at B1.
4. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997) (arguing that bankruptcy should focus on real questions
involving a real system that affects real people); Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic
Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 432
(1998) (challenging traditional notions of bankruptcy court standing and arguing that
those standards are too narrow).
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Chapter 11 cases. Courts have denied requests for the appointment of
special interest committees as well. Regardless of whether committees
are approved or rejected in individual cases, it seems clear that major
players in a large bankruptcy case will have to contend with this
dynamic somewhat more often than in the past.
This Article starts with a general doctrinal introduction to the
Bankruptcy Code sections and case law that control the creation and
appointment of committees. The Article then provides case studies from
four large corporate reorganizations: Enron, Kmart, Global Crossing,
and Pacific Gas and Electric. These case studies reveal the wide variety
of factual and legal settings in which the appointment of special interest
committees can become an important threshold legal issue in bankruptcy
cases. Finally, the last section of the Article discusses several potential
implications from the case studies. Special interest committees, properly
constituted and employed, can improve both the process and the
outcomes of corporate bankruptcy filings. However, this Article
advances several reasons why special interest committees are likely to
have an uncertain future in modern corporate reorganization law and
practice.
II. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND: SECTION 1102 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The Creation and Appointment of Creditors’ Committees
Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) provides the United
States Trustee with the duty and authority to appoint committees in
Chapter 11 cases.5 The statute provides in § 1102(a)(1) that the Trustee
must appoint a committee of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases.6
Additionally, the Trustee can appoint additional committees of creditors
or of equity security holders “as [the Trustee] deems appropriate.”7
Upon its own motion or upon a motion by a party in interest, the court
has the power to review the Trustee’s appointment of committees or
committee members.8
5. In re America West Airlines, 142 B.R. 901, 902 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992)
(stating that a U.S. Trustee has the power to remove, as well as appoint, members of
official committees).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
7. Id.
8. In re Plabell Rubber Prods., 140 B.R. 179, 181 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
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B. Standards for Appointment of Additional Committees
Section 1102 of the Code allows the Trustee to appoint additional
committees if the Trustee, in her discretion, finds an appointment
appropriate.9 As the Code offers little guidance as to when additional
creditors’ committees should be appointed by the Trustee, the issue is
resolved on a case-by-case basis. Section 1102(a)(2) provides that the
court may order the appointment of additional committees upon the
request of a party in interest and to ensure the adequate representation of
creditors and equity security holders.10 The party seeking an additional
committee has the burden of proof on the question of whether the
existing committee adequately represents the interests of all creditors.11
C. Factors Considered in the Appointment of Additional Committees
In determining whether to appoint an additional committee, courts
have considered several factors, including:12
9. One court has held that the appointment of additional committees by the
Trustee cannot be overturned or dissolved by the court. See In re New Life Fellowship,
Inc., 202 B.R. 994, 996 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
11. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996)
(“The burden is on the party seeking an additional committee to prove inadequate
representation.”).
12. See generally In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 141 (dividing the
§ 1102(a)(2) analysis into the following two components: (1) whether appointment of an
additional committee is necessary for adequate representation, (2) if yes, whether the
court should exercise discretion by making the appointment); In re Interco Inc., 141 B.R.
422, 424 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (listing non-exclusive factors, such as the ability of the
proposed committee to function, the nature of the case, cost, and delay, developed by
courts); In re Hills Stores, 137 B.R. 4, 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying appointment
of additional committee, and discussing the several factors of the case-by-case inquiry);
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 118 B.R. 209, 210-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (denying motion to appoint joint liquidators to the creditors’ committee, and
holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize such relief, the motion was
untimely, and that movants failed to show inadequate representation); In re Orfa Corp.,
121 B.R. 294, 297–99 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (denying separate creditors’ committee,
citing the lateness of the motion in the process, and the avoidance of additional
administrative costs as important factors); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 778
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding a separate committee not necessary, and noting that in
the Bankruptcy Code scheme, the reconciliation of differing interests of creditors within
a single committee is the norm, and that the appointment of a separate committee is an
extraordinary remedy); In re Public Service Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1019-20 (Bankr. D. N.H.
1988) (denying the appointment of a creditors’ committee, despite showing of
questionable representation, because of the delay in the proceedings such appointment
would cause, but granting the lesser remedy of expanding the existing committee); In re
McLean Indus. Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 862 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that concern for
adequate representation is heightened where only one committee is appointed for two or
more jointly administered cases, but that this does not require a separate committee per
se); In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ordering the merger of
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The nature and complexity of the Chapter 11 case.
The composition of the existing committee.
The plan’s treatment of differing classes.
The dissimilar interests of creditors.
The cost of additional committees.
The concern for adequate representation.
The stage at which recognition is sought.
The number of persons who would be represented.
III. SPECIAL INTEREST COMMITTEES IN LARGE CHAPTER 11
BANKRUPTCIES: CASE STUDIES
A. Enron
1. Employment-Related Issues Committee

The Enron bankruptcy case attracted an impressive amount of media
attention. One of the most compelling aspects of the case was the plight
of Enron workers and managers who suddenly found themselves in
precarious financial and professional situations.13 It was thus not
two unsecured creditors’ committees, noting the duplicative costs of separate
committees, and the adequacy of a single committee to represent what is essentially the
same class of unsecured creditors); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 155, 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that refusal to appoint equity committee was not an abuse of
discretion where equity interests were adequately represented, and such appointment
would delay confirmation of debtor’s reorganization plan); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55
B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (appointing additional committee to represent
wide-spread equity holders, and noting that opponents to the motions did not show that
the cost would be prohibitive); In re Emons Indus., 50 B.R. 692, 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (“[G]enerally no equity committee should be appointed when it appears that a
debtor is hopelessly insolvent because neither the debtor nor the creditors should have to
bear the expense of negotiating over the terms of what is in essence a gift.”); In re Salant
Corp., 53 B.R. 158, 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding separate employees’ committee
unwarranted where employees’ claims not large enough to justify separate committee,
and interest in continued employment is insufficient in itself to justify appointment of an
employees’ committee); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 45 B.R. 375, 376 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983) (denying appointment of an unsecured creditors’ committee where only a
potential conflict was established, but granting the appointment of a common
stockholders’ committee to assure adequate representation and protect the interest of
15,000-plus holders of debtor’s common stock).
13. See Shawn Young, In Bankruptcy, Getting Laid Off Hurts Even Worse, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A1. Young states:
Normally, employers offer benefits that soften the blow for many employees
who lose their jobs. But bankruptcy changes all the rules. In many cases,
workers have to get in line with other unsecured creditors for severance
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surprising that the U.S. Trustee in that case appointed an official
committee to represent the unique interests of Enron employees.14 The
employees argued that the unsecured creditors’ committee did not
adequately represent their interests. U.S. Trustee Carolyn Schwartz
agreed, citing Enron’s employee benefit plans’ coverage of over 20,000
workers and retirees.15 Once the official committee was appointed, it
had legal power to take sworn statements and subpoena documents and
witnesses. The appointment of the committee gave the ex-employees at
least an expectation that they would have more power to shape the
distribution of assets and the ultimate fate of the company than they
might otherwise have if their interests were filtered through a general
unsecured creditors’ committee.
The employee committee went right to work and, along with others,
helped to negotiate a $29 million severance settlement that was intended
to pay most former workers approximately $7000 to $8000.16 Given that
Enron was under no legal requirement to pay anything beyond $5600,
the additional severance recovery was a very significant development.17
The employee committee also played a key role in convincing the
bankruptcy court to authorize efforts to seek the return of $53 million in
controversial bonuses that went to key executives on the eve of
bankruptcy.18 The employee committee, on behalf of 4200 ex-Enron
employees, argued that the bonuses contravened the Code’s priority
scheme19 and were also unlawful preferential payments.20 As of this
writing, the litigation was still pending.

benefits, unused vacation pay, expenses and commissions—a process that can
leave them with mere pennies on the dollars that they’re owed.
Id.; Ellen E. Schultz, U.S. Taxpayers May Have to Pay Enron Workers’ Pension
Benefits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at C1 (describing Enron’s possibly illegal scheme
of permanently limiting pension benefits to a locked-in value of its employee stock
ownership plan).
14. Rebecca Smith, Enron’s Employees, in a Court Victory, Are Permitted to Form
Creditors’ Panel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2002, at A6.
15. Matthew Haggman, Committee Granted: U.S. Trustee Agrees with Miami
Lawyer’s Request for Creditors Panel Composed of Ex-Enron Employees, BROWARD
DAILY BUS. REV., Feb. 20, 2002, at A9, WL 2/20/2002 BROWARDDBR 8; Severed
Enron Employees Coalition, Former Employees Win ‘Place at Bankruptcy Table’ at
http://www.theseec.org/press/02152002pressrelease.shtml (Feb. 15, 2002).
16. Eric Berger, Former Enron Employees May Get $29 Million Severance Deal,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 5, 2002, 2002 WL 3268173.
17. Eric Berger, Enron Settlement Final: Added Severance to be Paid by Early
July, HOUSTON CHRON., June 12, 2002, 2002 WL 3269826.
18. Enron Bankruptcy Panel Authorized to Seek Return of Executive Bonuses,
BANKR. L. REP., Sept. 25, 2003, at 862.
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507, 726 (2000).
20. Enron Bankruptcy Panel Authorized to Seek Return of Executive Bonuses,
supra note 18, at 862.
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2. Energy Merchants’ Committee
A group of energy merchants also requested a special committee in the
Enron case. The “Ad Hoc Committee of Energy Merchants” argued that
a third committee was necessary because the energy trading company
Enron North America had a distinct identity and creditor mix that was
separate from Enron’s main business: power plants, natural gas reserves,
and pipelines.21 Presumably, the concern was that creditors of Enron
North America would not receive a fair distribution of assets if trading
business revenues were allocated to general creditors of the main
businesses. U.S. Trustee Schwartz resisted the idea and filed a formal
objection with the court in which she argued, among other things, that
the energy merchants were adequately represented by the creditors’
committee.22 The request for the special committee was denied.
B. Kmart
One of Kmart’s top shareholders requested that the United States
decide whether to appoint a shareholder panel in the Kmart bankruptcy
case. In contrast to the movement for the appointment of an employee
panel in the Enron case, the impetus for the Kmart shareholders’
committee came primarily from one person—Ronald Burkle.23 Burkle
owned approximately one million shares of the company’s common
stock.24 Not surprisingly, Burkle argued that shareholders needed their
own committee because neither the debtor nor the other creditors’
committee could adequately represent public shareholders.25
Prospects for the appointment of a shareholders’ committee improved
when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supported

21. Matthew Haggman, Miami Lawyer Asks U.S. Trustee in Enron Case to Create
a Third Creditors Committee, This One for Energy Traders, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV.,
Feb. 26, 2002, at A1, WL 2/26/2002 BROWARDDBR 1.
22. Objection of the United States Trustee to Motions of Certain Energy
Merchants and Enron North America Creditors for Orders, Pursuant to Section 1102(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, Directing the Appointment of Additional Committees at 10, In
re Enron Corp. (No. 01 B 16034 (AJG)) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/r02/pdf/Objection.pdf.
23. Kmart Shareholder Wants Committee To Represent Stock Owner’s Interest,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 19, 2002, 2002 WL 19258925.
24. Id.
25. Shareholder Asks To Add Equity Panel To K-Mart Bankruptcy Case,
http://www.abiworld.org, Apr. 19, 2002 (on file with author).
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Burkle’s request.26 The SEC gave a number of reasons why it supported
the formation of such a committee, including the size of the case, the
complexity of Kmart’s business, the heterogeneity of its shareholders,
and the dynamic nature of the pending negotiations between the debtor
and its creditor.27 Also lurking in the background was the concern of the
SEC and others that Kmart’s top executives had taken advantage of
company-backed loans, and loan forgiveness, in the millions of dollars.28
The idea of appointing a shareholders’ committee was not without its
critics. One argument was that it would slow down the reorganization
process considerably.29 There was also a concern that it would draw
unwanted attention to the executive loan forgiveness and thus create a
public relations problem for the reorganizing debtor.30
After reviewing Kmart’s annual report and recent financial statements,
U.S. Trustee Ira Bodenstein appointed a shareholders’ committee.31
Bodenstein gave as his chief reason the possibility that Kmart would
have enough money, in the end, to pay its shareholders.32
C. Global Crossing
A group of former Global Crossing employees also requested a
separate committee to represent their interests. The company dismissed
approximately 1500 employees and paid about $18 million in severance
and vacation pay.33 Of the $32 million owed by the company to
approximately 1200 workers, approximately $5.5 million was entitled to
priority payment. The employee group argued that the creditors’
committee as constituted could not successfully protect the interests of
employees.34 Unlike the Enron bankruptcy, the debtor and senior
creditors took a more active role in objecting to the employees’
request.35 U.S. Trustee Carolyn Schwartz declined the request.36 An
employee committee was not appointed. Interestingly, the day after the
26. Amy Merrick, SEC Supports Holder Committee For the Kmart Bankruptcy
Case, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at B12.
27. Id.
28. Id.; Tim Craig, Kmart Can’t Afford a Loan Scandal, DSN RETAILING TODAY,
May 6, 2002 at 11, available at 2002 WL 10055402.
29. Craig, supra note 28, at 11.
30. Id.
31. Brent Snavely, Shareholders Get Voice in Kmart Bankruptcy, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUS., June 3, 2002, at 41, 2002 WL 10365487.
32. Id.
33. Global Crossing, Lenders Oppose Forming Ex-Employee Panel,
http://www.abiworld.org, May 15, 2002 (on file with author).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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bankruptcy court was scheduled to hold a hearing on the request, Global
Crossing offered to pay priority claims of $5.5 million to some former
employees.37
D. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)
1. Local Government Panel
Cities and counties in California requested a special committee in the
Pacific Gas and Electric bankruptcy. These local governments argued
that a special committee was necessary because they faced unique issues
not faced by private creditors, including tax obligations and
environmental concerns.38 Although U.S. Trustee Linda Stanley initially
rejected the idea, even she conceded that the local governments have less
of a consensual relationship with the debtor utility than do private
creditors.39 Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali refused to order the
appointment of the local government committee, citing what he believed
to be adequate representation on the main panel.40
2. Ratepayers’ Committee
The U.S. Trustee appointed a ratepayers’ committee to represent the
interests of a broad group of consumers.41 This move was open to legal
challenge because ratepayers are not official creditors of a debtor utility.
Thus, those who opposed the move, including PG&E, could argue that
the ratepayers could not have their own committee even if it were
justified, as a policy matter, under the broad standard of adequate
representation. PG&E also argued that, even if ratepayers were entitled
to participate, they could do so through government officials such as the
state Attorney General.42 Judge Montali denied the appointment.43
37. Global Crossing Offers Deal To Employees, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2002, at C2,
available at 2002 WL 2476167.
38. Bob Egelko, Governments are Denied PG&E Bankruptcy Panel, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 8, 2001, at B1, 2001 WL 3421890.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. PG&E Files Opposition to Ratepayers’ Committee, BUS. WIRE, May 9, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, Bwire File.
42. PG&E Issues Statement on Court’s Decision on Ratepayers’ Committee, BUS.
WIRE, May 18, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Bwire File.
43. Judge Rules Against Ratepayers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2001, 2001 WL
24710621.
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IV. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
There are several potential implications that can be gleaned from this
survey of recent developments. First, requests to appoint special interest
committees are sometimes granted in high profile cases and sometimes
denied in high profile cases. Much depends on the nature of the request,
the size and complexity of the case, and the unique social, political, and
economic environment of each case.
Second, special interest
committees can provide an equitable and efficient means to spread the
losses that accompany massive financial distress. In addition to the
potential financial benefits, special interest committees can provide
crucial social support and institutional transparency. Special interest
committees can also lend a sense of openness and legitimacy to a
process than often seems quite mysterious to outsiders.
Despite these real and perceived benefits, the appointment of special
interest committees will probably not become routine, even in very large
cases. We might continue to see a fairly high number of requests, if only
so that a group of creditors can gain leverage in the opening days and
weeks of a filing. However, it is unlikely that we will see an equally
high number of formal appointments. There are several legal and
practical reasons for this, as the next section of this Article will explain.
A. Theoretical Dilemmas
Modern American bankruptcy law is a process that emphasizes a
collective approach to the problem of debt collection. Indeed, one of the
core benefits of bankruptcy is the way in which individual creditors
exchange state law rights to a single action against a debtor for a different
regime of federal rights and powers under the Code.44 At least at the
level of theory, the idea is that all creditors submit to a collective and
compulsory process that leaves them better off than if they each pursued
single collection efforts against an insolvent debtor in financial distress.
This idea is reflected in, among other places, § 1102’s mandate for a
general unsecured creditors’ committee to represent the interests of all
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11 case. In contrast, the theory
animating the request for a special interest committee is that a single
creditor group would be better off pursuing a singular agenda in a
44. Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 28–31
(1986) (arguing that bankruptcy’s collective and compulsory approach to debt collection
is desirable because it maximizes the value of a given pool of assets). See generally
Mary Josephine Newborn, The New Rawlsian Theory of Bankruptcy Ethics, 16 CARDOZO
L. REV. 111, 114–18 (1994) (describing the collective approach and contrasting it with
state law theory of the “race to the courthouse”).

1382

WIGGINS.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1373, 2004]

8/22/2019 1:56 PM

Finance and Factionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

separate committee than it would be casting its fate with a broader
group.
The traditional collective action model assumes that bankruptcy is, at
its core, a financial process, driven largely by economic returns and cold
financial realities. The special interest model, by contrast, recasts
bankruptcy as a political process.45 Under this view, the reorganization
process is always “political,” in the traditional sense of the word. Issues
of voice, representation, legitimacy, and transparency become key
policies that must be considered along with the traditional bankruptcy
policies (i.e., fresh start, reorganization policy, etc.). The unification of
creditor interests that was thought to be a key component of traditional
bankruptcy thinking must incorporate the fragmentation of interests that
we usually associate with special interest politics. In fact, one suspects
that some of the antipathy toward special interest committees among
some in the bankruptcy bench and bar might be traced to the sense that
the unchecked proliferation of such committees will politicize the
bankruptcy process in unattractive and unproductive ways.
B. Vague Legal Standards
Section 1102 does not provide a clear and determinate set of
guidelines for decision makers to use when considering the appointment
of special interest committees. Without clear rules, outcomes are more
uncertain. A rational creditor group can make the calculation that the
odds of prevailing on a request for a special committee are about as good
as the odds of not prevailing. Given that the cost of this litigation is
rarely cost prohibitive, creditors have powerful incentives to request
such committees.
Additionally, the vague standards in § 1102 give trustees and judges
fairly wide discretion when making decisions on whether to appoint or
approve a committee. It also means that decision makers can provide
credible justifications for whatever outcomes they generate. So, while
the vagueness of the standards makes it more likely that we continue to
see a fairly high number of requests, those same “muddy” standards
make it easier for trustees and judges to deny such appointments without
giving highly detailed and elaborate reasons for doing so.
45. Reid J. Epstein, WorldCom Shareholders Get in Line, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2002, at D2, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3401576 (quoting Todd Zywicki, “Bankruptcy
is both a financial and a political process”).
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Commentators have suggested legal reforms designed to provide more
clarity and predictability in this area.46
C. Empirical Reality of Modern Corporate Reorganizations
According to Professor Douglas Baird’s recent study of large
corporate reorganizations, many large Chapter 11 cases today are
characterized by assets sales to third parties and the ratification of preexisting merger/acquisition deals.47 While this study is not without its
limitations,48 one important implication of its findings is that an
influential role for special interest committees is unlikely in most large
Chapter 11 cases. For example, the study suggests that senior creditors
are in firm control of these cases.49 The study suggests rigid adherence
to the absolute priority rule, meaning that equity and junior creditors, the
usual initiators of special interest committees, do very poorly in terms of
financial recovery.50
Finally, the study suggests that a meaningful percentage of large cases
involve companies with little or no going concern value and no business
perceived as worth saving.51 This study presents a picture of modern
corporate reorganizations as court-supervised mergers and acquisitions
work. This is not an environment that lends itself to a high degree of
special interest bargaining and political gamesmanship by junior
creditors.
Anecdotal reports confirm that debtors and senior creditors are
increasingly entering into previously negotiated agreements that largely
set the terms of the Chapter 11 case well before the case is actually
filed.52 The use of debtor-in-possession financing and the willingness of
some bankruptcy courts to approve so-called “first-day orders” potentially
leaves many unsecured creditors without adequate notice or protection or
both. Special interest committees might be disadvantaged even further
since it typically takes them several weeks, if not months, to properly
organize and develop a coherent strategy. By that time, the debtor and
46. See SABRE II Report, 59 BUS. LAW. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 9, on
file with author) (proposing that in cases in which a committee is appointed, the U.S.
Trustee shall appoint a single creditors’ committee and shall not appoint additional
creditors’ or equity holders’ committees except in extraordinary circumstances).
47. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 11, on file with author).
48. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 1-4, on file with author).
49. Baird, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11-12).
50. Baird, supra note 47 (manuscript at 13).
51. Baird, supra note 47 (manuscript at 12-13).
52. Several lawyers who routinely represent creditors’ committees in Chapter 11
cases have reported this phenomenon to me.
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senior creditors have likely made decisions that could undermine the
committee’s financial leverage and control.
V. CONCLUSION
Special interest committees can do a lot of good in corporate
bankruptcies. They can play a crucial role in redistributing assets to
reflect the values of fairness and equity. They can also provide much
needed social support and they can help engender confidence in the
bankruptcy process, particularly for those who have only sporadic
interactions with it. However, special interest committees can also have
potential downsides. Factionalism and inefficiency are obvious ones. A
hidden danger lurks in the possibility that the special interest committee
can itself become co-opted by those within the creditor body that have
more resources and expertise than others in the group. Another potential
problem could arise if the formal appointment of a special committee
triggers a relaxation of informal protection mechanisms for more
vulnerable creditor groups. While the appointment of special interest
committees may not (and perhaps should not) become routine, the topic
continues to be an important one because special interest committees
force us to rethink what corporate bankruptcy law exists to do and how
we might sensibly distinguish it from other legal systems.
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